Download Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal by James B. Freeman PDF

By James B. Freeman

While, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an issue? what's the right criterion of premise acceptability? supplying a accomplished thought of premise acceptability, this booklet solutions those questions from an epistemological technique that the writer calls "common experience foundationalism". His paintings can be of curiosity to experts in casual common sense, serious pondering and argumentation concept in addition to to a broader diversity of philosophers and people instructing rhetoric.

Show description

Read Online or Download Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem PDF

Similar logic & language books

The Development of Modern Logic

This edited quantity offers a entire historical past of contemporary common sense from the center a while during the finish of the 20th century. as well as a background of symbolic good judgment, the members additionally study advancements within the philosophy of good judgment and philosophical common sense nowa days. The ebook starts with chapters on past due medieval advancements and common sense and philosophy of good judgment from Humanism to Kant.

Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox

The Liar paradox increases foundational questions about common sense, language, and fact (and semantic notions in general). an easy Liar sentence like 'This sentence is fake' seems to be either actual and fake whether it is both actual or fake. For if the sentence is correct, then what it says is the case; yet what it says is that it really is fake, for that reason it has to be fake.

Extra resources for Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem

Example text

Inherent probability is no criterion of acceptability. We may contrast inherent probability with epistemic probability, the probability of a statement relative to all our relevant background Why do We Need a Theory of Acceptability? 17 knowledge. This is “the best estimate of the statement’s truth, based on everything we know” (Nolt 1984, p. 193). Only when we have no evidence whatsoever bearing on a proposition is its epistemic probability the same as its inherent probability. (Compare Nolt 1984, p.

But what does that mean? , given that] its premises are true, and it is not deductively valid” (1986, p. 7). The problem with this definition, which Skyrms would readily admit, is that the key term “improbable” is intuitive and not defined. What do we mean by saying that it is improbable that the conclusion of an argument is false given that its premises are true? The response is that there is “no precise, uncontroversial definition” (Skyrms 1986, p. 20). What inductive probability is remains an outstanding problem of inductive logic (Skyrms 1986, p.

157–8) But there is a false dichotomy here. In delimiting those premises that are properly rationally acceptable, we do not have to choose between those that are merely accepted although not challenged and those which are indubitable – beyond all challenge. It is at least logically possible that there is a third category – premises for which challenge is logically conceivable but that need not be challenged at the current point. And this is not simply a matter of challenger failure to put forward an objection.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.79 of 5 – based on 42 votes